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Redistributive taxation can be- and often is used by progressive
governments to promote equality. But in Torts, Egalitarianism and
Distributive Justice Tsachi Keren-Paz argues that tort law should also be
used to promote equality. I
Admittedly, typically tort law is not egalitarian - here are two of the
many examples that Keren-Paz offers. For instance, by returning people to
their earlier situation, the restitutio ad integrum principle in effect protects
inegalitarian patterns of distribution since the wealthy are returned to their
prior well-off position, while the poor are only returned to their prior badly-
off position. 2 What makes matters even worse is that since tort law works in
tandem with liability insurance, wealthy people's superior level of
protection is subsidized by the poor who pay similar liability insurance
premiums to the wealthy3 but yet they benefit from them less. 4 Secondly,
tort law's use of an objective standard of care in the moral assessment of
people's actions (whether they were negligent or not) also unfairly
disadvantages the poor because to avoid being found negligent people must
take sufficient care, however since taking care may come at a cost and the
poor have fewer resources than wealthy people do, it is therefore relatively
harder (in real rather than numericaVmonetary terms) for them to take the
same precautions, but yet tort law's objective standard expects both to take
the same level of precautions. 5
Nevertheless, Keren-Paz argues that there is no principled reason
why tort law could not be reformed so as to take egalitarian considerations
into account. For instance, when calculating damages for lost income, rather
than trying to estimate how much income a particular plaintiff would have
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earned in the future if the tort had not occurred and then awarding that
amount of damages to them, which replicates socia-economic and gender-
based inequalities in levels of pay that still exist today,6 Keren-Paz instead
suggests that everyone - irrespective of age, gender or prior socia-economic
situation - should only be entitled to the same standardized income
replacement set at the level of an average income. 7 Secondly, he also argues
that there is no principled reason why a subjective standard of care could
not be used in the context of the negligence inquiry, which on the Learned
Hand formulation gets us to compare the value of the potential victims'
security interests to the value of their injurer's liberty interests; this would
be done by comparing the real value or impact (rather than the
numerical/monetary values) of the respective parties' interests to one
another, to take into account the fact that it is more burdensome for the poor
to take the same level of precautions as the wealthy take. 8
Keren-Paz also cites precedents to show that this way of thinking is
not alien to to11 law. 9 For instance, in Paris v Stepney Borough Council
[1951]10 the special vulnerability of an employee who only had one good
eye was taken as a reason to hold their employer negligent for failing to
provide them with protective eye goggles, even though their failure to
provide goggles to employees with two good eyes was not deemed
negligent - this suggests that the plaintiff's situation does affect our
judgment of what standard of care is owed to them. Secondly, the fact that
cOUlis are more likely to award damages when defendants have deep rather
than shallow pockets suggests that defendants' situation affects our
judgment of what standard of care they owe to others. The point of citing
these precedents is to show that since tort law is already prepared to take
into account the level of resources available to litigants when determining
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shift from an objective to a subjective standard of care) would not require a
revolution but only evolution or incremental tort law reform. II
Keren-Paz holds that we should in general promote egalitarian
aims l2 , and since on his account tort law can promote these aims (see
Chapter 3), he therefore argues that in addition to whatever else we do (e.g.
funding social welfare systems) we should also promote equality through
tort law (i.e. tort law should supplement these other efforts). Consequently,
a sizeable portion of this book is devoted to working out the many fine
details of precisely what might be involved in taking adequate account of
egalitarian considerations within tort law.
On Keren-Paz's account, ensuring that tort law takes adequate
account of egalitarian considerations is no simple t.ask since lots of things
may impact on whether a given tort rule or judgment will have an
egalitarian effect or not. Some of the things which complicate matters here
include: (i) the bilateral nature of the tort remedy - the fact that the fates of
plaintiffs and defendants are tied toget.her, so that compensating one party
leaves someone else worse off; (ii) the many different interests over which
tort law adjudicates, each of which may be differently affected by a given
tort rule - e.g. tangible goods, liberty, dignity, power, status, cont.rol,
security and social responsibility - and each of which may impact
differently on people's wellbeing; (iii) the many different parties which tort
rules affect - for instance, in addition to the litigants, third parties may
also be affected by the symbolic effects of a given judgment; 13 (iv) the
subtle complexities and interrelations between different litigants - e.g.
dependencies between mother and child,14 subtle interactions between a
live-in landlord and their tenant, or the loss-spreading which goes on when
an insurer passes on their greater costs to the insured by raising premiums
thus drawing us away from the desired distribution of resources; (v) the fact
that we may wish to pursue- and thus that we may need t.o reconcile the
pursuit of plural aims (not just egalitarian ones) each of which pulls in a
different direction; and (vi) a host of other contextual issues that will
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Keren-Paz's clear, careful and intricate analysis suggests that if
sufficient attention is paid to these many details, then t01t law will be able
to promote egalitarian aims. But, even if he is right that with sufficient
attention paid to these details tort law could promote egalitarian aims, two
questions still beckon: (1) whether it is practical to expect courts to
routinely take so many considerations into account in adjudicating every
case, and (2) whether tort law is really the best tool for the given job of
promoting equality? Twill now say a little more about each of these worries.
As 1 mention above, a sizeable portion of this book's analysis is
devoted to discussing the many intricate details which must be taken into
account if tort law is to promote equal ity. However, although the
implementation of some of Keren-Paz's recommendations would arguably
only involve a small amount of extra work,15 taking account of some of the
other things which he mentions would come at a considerable
administrative cost. For instance, it is not always clear what other interests
will be affected by a given ruling; or who else will be affected by that ruling
and how they might respond (which may upset the distributive outcome that
we were trying to bring about by the tort ruling); or even what kinds of
subtle interrelations might obtain between different (groups of) the affected
parties. Each of these things may ultimately affect whether a given ruling
would have an overall egalitarian or an opposite effect, and so each of them
should be given their due consideration, but if courts have to pay attention
to all of these details then this will impose a considerable additional
administrative burden onto them and this might make the reformed-tolt-Iaw
solution less efficient than alternative solutions (see below for comments on
efficiency). Some of this worry could dissipate if Keren-Paz's
recommendations were targeted solely at reformers, since this would entail
only a one-time administrative cost to be borne by them (plus some extra
time for the courts to get acquainted with the modified system). However,
his recommendations are targeted just as much at judges as they are at
reformers,16 and so this worry can not be put aside this easily.
As regards the second worry - i.e. whether tort law is really the best
tool for the job of promoting equality - Keren-Paz interprets it in three
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ways,17 and he offers three replies. First, he claims that '[t]ort law has been
remarkably resilient and does not appear to be fading away; rather it is the
welfare state which is under siege,.18 Second, and in response to an
interpretation of this worry which he calls 'the good being the enemy of the
best' and which he attributes to Stephen Sugarman, he states that 'the
Scandinavian experience shows ... that inserting egalitarian sensitivity into
tort law might' lead to 'an increase in state welfarism'. 19 And third, he
claims that it is only if we are 'committed to a monistic approach,2o about
value that we will see the need to sacrifice some egalitarian goals for the
sake of the other more traditional goals which tort law has been thought to
pursue as something to regret.
However I do not think that any of these responses meets my worry,
and I will briefly explain in reverse order. As regards his third point~ there is
nothing objectionably value-monistic about recognising that tort law is
inefficient and that we can get better value for money from another setup;
after all, we can strive to pursue plural aims at the lowest possible price
without thereby having to sacrifice the pursuit of any of those aims for the
sake of even greater efficiency. As regards his second point, apart from
doubts about whether the move towards increased state welfarism in
Finland was indeed caused by inserting egalitarian sensitivity into tort law,
we can still surely ask whether the same result (increased state welfarism)
couldn't be achieved in a cheaper way (e.g. perhaps through advertising
campaigns) than at the hefty price tag of the tort law system. And finally, as
regards his first point, suppose for instance that tort law were abolished
completely and that people were only allowed to claim no-fault benefits
from the social welfare system; if this setup did a better job of promoting
the aims which we wanted to promote than the reformed-tOli-law based
setup and it did this at a lower administrative cost too, then shouldn't we
choose this other system rather than the reformed tort law alternative? Thus,
if my first worry about the complexity of Keren-Paz's solution is justified,
then that solution may indeed turn out to be very expensive, and that in turn
might give us reason to search for another tool - e.g. social welfare or no-
fault systems - which is better suited for the job of promoting the aims that
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So in summary, this book presents impressingly detailed analysis that
bolsters the case in favour of incremental tort law reform. However,
although its greatest strength is the depth of analysis offered, at the same
time supporters of radical law reform proposals may interpret the
complexity of the solution that is offered (and its respective cost) as
conclusive proof that tort law can only take adequate account of egalitarian
aims at an unacceptably high cost.
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